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MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE:
A BRIEF HISTORY
ROBERT E. HELM *
A motorist, permanently crippled in an automobile acci-
dent, is denied recovery for his injuries because of his
contributory negligence." The claim of a pedestrian who
has been severely injured by a hit and run driver is denied
because notice of intent to make a claim was not timely
filed.2 A third accident victim is advised that his prospects
for eventually recovering damages are good, but that present
court congestion will delay the trial of the action, and,
hence, delay receipt of funds to pay mounting bills for at least
three years.3 A parent, unaware that his insurance has been
cancelled, returns from his vacation and learns that his
driver's license and vehicle registration have been revoked.
* B.A. 1960, Syracuse University; LL.B. 1962, Syracuse University,
College of Law; Counsel, New York State Department of Motor Vehicles.
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent the views of the Department of Motor Vehicles.
'Although the subject has been discussed at length by both the bench
and bar, few jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence. See, e.g., INsTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE (Supp. 1959); Gregory, Loss Distribution, by Comparative
Negligence, 21 MINN. L. Rxv. 1 (1936).2 Section 603 of the New York Insurance Law requires that a notice
of intent to file a claim be made within 90 days of accrual of the cause of
action, or within 10 days of an insurer's disclaimer of liability. The
required notice is a condition precedent to recovering against the Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, and a late filing can only be
accepted under limited conditions.
3 In testimony given on February 29, 1968, before Governor Rockefeller's
Committee on Compensating Victims of Automobile Accidents, the Honor-
able Thomas McCoy, State Administrator of the New York Judicial Con-
ference, stated that, according to the latest figures available, approximately
47.9 percent of the calendar of the New York Supreme Court, statewide,
consists of motor vehicle accident cases. Furthermore, the average delay
after filing a note of issue or certificate of readiness is in excess of 30
months in many counties, and 58 months in Suffolk and Dutchess Counties.
Moreover, the delay for personal injury cases in the Civil Court of the City
of New York ranged from 19 months in Richmond County, to 59 months
in Kings County. Nor are such delays limited to the courts of New York,
as is evidenced by the fact that the average delay for similar cases is
64 months in the Circuit Court in Cook County, Illinois.
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Revocation resulted from his son's operation of the family
car after the cancellation of insurance had been effected."
Were cases such as these merely isolated curiosities,
their impact on society as a whole might be viewed as al-
most insignificant. The fact that such cases have occurred,
and are occurring, on a daily basis, however, transforms the
tragedies visited upon the participants into a matter which
demands the collective rethinking of both the public and
private sector alike. This conclusion is by no means novel,
as is evidenced by the resurgence of books and articles on
the subject,5 and the renewed governmental activity, at both
the state and federal levels, in the area of automobile in-
surance.
8
4 Section 313 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law provides that
no motor vehicle liability insurance policy can be terminated until 20 days
(10 days in the case of non-payment of premium) after notice has been
mailed to the insured. Where such notice is mailed to the address shown
on the policy, actual receipt of the notice is not a condition precedent to
cancellation.
Section 318(2)(a) of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law requires
the vehicle registration and the owner's driver's license to be revoked for
at least one year if the owner has permitted the vehicle to be operated
without insurance. The fact that the owner did not know that his insur-
ance had been cancelled or terminated (e.g., did not receive a properly
addressed notice) is not a defense; revocation is required where (a) the
vehicle was operated with the permission of the owner and (b) the vehicle
was not insured. See, e.g., Stevens v. Hults, 41 Misc. 2d 168, 245 N.Y.S.2d
425 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Berger v. Kelly, 13 Misc. 2d 769, 178 N.Y.S.2d 514
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
5 See, e.g., W. BLum & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPrCnVES ON A
PRIVATE LAW PRonm.r-AuTo COMPENSATION PLANS (1965); A. CONRAD,
J. MORGAN, R. PRATt, C. VoLTz & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOoarLE AccmIENTs
COSTS AND PAYMENTS-STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INjuRY REPARATION
(1964); R. KEnrN & J. O'CONNELL, BAsrc PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFaIc
VCicTL. (1965) ; Marshall, The Unreality of Accident Litigation: A Plea
for a New Appoach, 50 A.B.A.J. 713 (1964).
In view of the nature and extent of the problem, it is not surprising
that there is an abundance of books and articles on the subject of auto-
mobile insurance, almost dating back to the manufacture of the first vehicle
in this country. In this author's opinion, the most significant contribution
to the field is Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim, supra. The
clear and logical presentation by Professors Keeton and O'Connell com-
bined with their exhaustive footnotes and outstanding bibliography, make
this book required reading for any serious student in the subject.
6 At the federal level, the automobile insurance problem is receiving
scrutiny from the Department of Transportation and the Federal Trade
Commission, as well as from at least five Congressional subcommittees.
Automobile insurance also was the subject of hearings held this fall by the
New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and
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In New York, Governor Rockefeller recently appointed
a distinguished committee to study means of improving our
"outdated, inequitable, slow and expensive system for com-
pensating accident victims." - In announcing the appoint-
ment, Governor Rockefeller stated, "[i]t is time to bring
our accident compensation out of the horsedrawn era into
which it was born, and into the motorized age which it is
supposed to serve." I
The re-examination of the subject of compensation of
victims of automobile accidents which is presently in pro-
cess in New York -State, and, indeed, throughout the
country, will, of necessity, include a review of the history
of automobile liability insurance. This article will present
such a review, with particular emphasis on the goals of our
insurance system as it developed, and its successes and
failures in meeting such goals. Because of the author's
participation in the administration of the present "com-
pulsory" insurance system in New York, this article will
deal primarily with the history of automobile insurance in
that state, although it is hoped that the problems and
solutions discussed will have general application through-
out the country.
GEN ,RAL
While the concept of liability for damages resulting
from automobile accidents has remained relatively con-
stant,9 the concept of the duty to insure against such
liability has evolved through at least three well-identified
Regulation. The Basic Protection Plan (Basic Protection for the Traffic
Victim, supra) was introduced in the legislatures of several states, including
New York, in 1967, but failed of passage.
7 Remarks by Governor Rockefeller, Annual Luncheon Meeting of the
State Traffic Safety Council of New York, November 29, 1967.
8 Id.
9 For an interesting discussion of the derivation of the "fault" doctrine,
see Schneider, The Historical Developmient of Attaching Liability to Fault,
6 LAW Soc'v J. 747 (1935). While some jurisdictions have adopted the
doctrine of comparative negligence (e.g., Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi,
Nebraska, South Dakota) and others have enacted "imputed negligence"
statutes (e.g., N.Y. VEHIcrLa & TRAFFIc LAW § 388), the basic requirement
of "fault" has remained constant.
1968 ]
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phases in most jurisdictions. For the purposes of this
article, these phases will be identified, as "free-choice,"
"limited-compulsory," and "limited-compulsory extended."
A fourth phase, that of "compulsory insurance" has been
reached, at least in the "pure" sense, in only three juris-
dictions." Although these "phases" will be discussed in
the order presented above, it should be noted that not all
jurisdictions were sufficiently aware of the existence of the
author's chronological "phases" as to develop their insur-
ance systems accordingly.
FRDB-OHOIcE
One reads with some humor about the early ordinances
which restricted the speed of 1"horseless carriages" to five
miles per hour, or which required the vehicle, when oper-
ated in a community, to be preceded by a "crier" so that
other users of the highways would have adequate warning.
Indeed, the early motorist was restricted more in the use
of his motorcar than in his option of whether to purchase
liability insurance.
However, with the increased acceptance and use of
motor vehicles, and the resulting increase in accidents,
deaths and injuries, the pressures to remove the financially
irresponsible motorist from the roads also increased. As
is true with much of our significant social legislation, the
"ultimate" solution to this ever-increasing problem was
presaged by numerous articles and commentaries before
affirmative legislative action was taken."
'ONew York, North Carolina and Massachusetts. However, many juris-
dictions have approached a form of compulsory insurance through the use
of special registration assessments for uninsured vehicles, and virtually all
jurisdictions have adopted the "compulsory insurance" concept for public
carriers.
" See, e.g., Marx, The Curse of the Personal Injury Suit and a Remedy,
10 A.B.A.J. 493 (1924); Ives, Compulsory Liability Insurance, with Special
Reference to Attomobiles, 10 A.B.A.J. 697 (1924); Comnulsory Automobile
Initrance Laws Now Proposed on Same Principle as Worknen's Accident
Insurance, 15 Am. LAB. LEG. REv. 370 (1925).
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LIMITD-COMPULSORY INSURANCE
Interestingly enough, the solution to the increasing
uninsured accident problem proposed by most writers in
the 1920's was the adoption of a compulsory insurance
law quite similar to the law presently in existence in New
York, Massachusetts and North Carolina. The Legislature
in Massachusetts reacted swiftly to the new concept, and
that state became the first American jurisdiction to enact
a program of "forced" insurance when a compulsory insur-
ance law was enacted in 1925.12 However, possibly in
reaction to the action taken in Massachusetts, the opposi-
tion to the concept of compulsory insurance was able to
rally sufficient strength to forestall its adoption in other
jurisdictions for over thirty years, until it was adopted by
New York in 1956 " and North Carolina in 1957."
Although it may appear strange at first, the major
opposition to the concept of compulsory insurance when
it initially was being considered in the 1920's, and indeed,
consistently thereafter, was the insurance industry itself.
The basic reasons for such opposition will be discussed
later in this article. However, because of the increasing
demand for a workable solution to the spiraling vehicle
accident-uncompensated damage problem, the opposition to
compulsory insurance quickly realized that an alternative
solution would have to be offered. The alternative which
was proposed, and accepted by virtually every jurisdiction
except Massachusetts, was the so-called "safety responsi-
bility" legislation. This article refers to such legislation
as the "limited-compulsory" insurance acts, since the latter
terminology more closely describes the actual legislation.
The primary goal of the initial limited-compulsory acts
was to remove financially irresponsible and dangerous driv-
12The original act was effective in 1927. Although adopted only in
Massachusetts, insurance legislation was proposed in approximately half the
states in 1925. Report of the New York Joint Legislative Committee to
Investigate Automobile Insurance, LEG. Doc. No. 84 (1937).
"3N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655 (Now N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW,
art. 6).
14 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1957, ch. 1393 (Now N.C. GEN. STAT., ch. 20,
art. 13).
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ers from the roads. To achieve this goal, most of the
original acts required a motorist, upon his involvement in
an accident resulting in a judgment or upon conviction of
certain enumerated traffic offenses, to submit proof of his
ability to respond to damages in the future. The driver's
license and vehicle registration were generally suspended
pending receipt of the required "proof."
The limited-compulsory insurance concept was initially
adopted in New York in 1929."5 Several similar bills, and
bills which would have adopted the "pure" compulsory in-
surance concept, had failed to win approval in that state
in prior years. The 1929 act added a new Article 6-A to
the Vehicle and Traffic Law, entitled "Financial Respon-
sibility For Operation of Motor Vehicles." "I
Under the New York act, the operator's license and
all registrations of vehicles owned by a person convicted of
the following offenses were required to be suspended:
1. reckless driving, where property damage or personal
injury is involved;
2. speeding, where property damage or personal injury
is involved;
3. unlicensed operation;
4. driving while intoxicated;
5. leaving the scene of an accident without stopping; or
6. any of the above offenses committed in another
state."
Such suspension remained in effect, and no vehicle
could be registered in such person's name, until proof of
ability to respond to damages in the future was furnished
to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. Such proof, which
could be in the form of an insurance policy, 8 was required
to cover damages of at least $5,000 for bodily injury to one
15 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1929, ch. 695.
16 Id.
17 Id. § 94-a. An exception was made in the case of a person operating
the vehicle of his employer, where the employee did not own a motor vehicle.
In such case, the suspension would be terminated upon the employer's sub-
mission of the required proof.
18 Id. § 94-c.
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person, $10,000 for bodily injury to two or more persons
and .51,000 for property damage arising out of any accident.
In the event a non-resident was involved, the privilege of
operating any motor vehicle in New York, and the privilege
of operating within New York any motor vehicle owned
by such non-resident, was withdrawn pending the submis-
sion of the required proof.
The New York act also provided for suspension of the
driver's license and vehicle registration for the failure to
satisfy a monetary judgment for more than $100 resulting
from a motor vehicle accident.19 Under the act, the Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles was required to order such
suspension where a resident motorist, within fifteen (15)
days of the time the judgment of a vew York court became
final, failed to satisfy such judgment at least to the amounts
of ,$5,000. per person for bodily injury, $10,000 for bodily
injury to two or more persons and $1,000 for property
damage per accident. In addition, the suspension remained
in effect until "proof" was submitted of ability to respond
to damages in the future. The privileges of a non-resident
were suspended in a similar manner, whether the judg-
ment was obtained in New York or elsewhere.2"
The "proof" of ability to respond to damages in the
future could be in the form of a motor vehicle liability
policy, an approved bond, or a deposit of a sum of money
or collateral.2 Such insurance or bond could not be can-
celled unless ten days prior notice was given the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles. The purpose of the ten-day
notice provision was to give the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles an opportunity to obtain the number plates of the
affected vehicles. However, this period, as a practical mat-
ter, did not allow sufficient time to obtain such plates
19Id. § 94-b.20Id. As a practical matter, suspension only occurred when the judg-
ment was obtained in New York, since the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
only received notice of judgment in such cases. As a result, the serious
equal protection problem arising from the stricter rule applied to non-
residents never arose in a contested case. The constitutional problem was
eliminated in 1931.
211d. §94-c.
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where they were not voluntarily surrendered. Although
this requirement is still in the Vehicle and Traffic Law,2
it has been superseded by a provision which now requires
advance notice of cancellation to the insured."
The original New York act was substantially amended
during the next eleven years,"' prior to its repeal in 1941.2"
Although many of these amendments resulted in only tech-
nical clarification, some were designed to strengthen the
new limited-compulsory insurance law," while at least one
decidedly weakened its provisions."
By the late 1930's, however, it became apparent that
the limited-compulsory insurance approach was not meeting
its avowed goals of removing the unsafe and irresponsible
drivers from the roads. The failure of the original legisla-
tion was accentuated by the fact that the motor vehicle
had, by this time, firmly established itself as one of the
22 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAW § 347.
23 Section 346 of the N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law provides as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person, on and after
February first, nineteen hundred fifty-seven, shall be required to file or
maintain proof of financial responsibility pursuant to this article." The
"proof" requirements are now governed by Art. 6 of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law, the "Compulsory Insurance Law" (§§ 310-21). Section 313 of
such law provides that no insurance policy can be cancelled unless 20 days
written notice (10 days in the event of non-payment of premium) has been
given the insured. It also requires that notice of cancellation or termination
be filed with the Commissioner within 30 days of cancellation, but the
failure to so file has been held not to affect such cancellation or termination.
Murry v. Allstate Ins. Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 958, 229 N.Y.S.2d 776 (2d
Dep't 1962); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Altman, 21 Misc. 2d 162, 191 N.Y.S.2d 270
(Sup. Ct. 1959).
24 The original act was amended on twenty-six occasions between 1929
and 1941.
25N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, ch. 872. Chapter 872 enacted the "limited-
compulsory-extended" phase of New York's automobile liability insurance
law.
26 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1930, ch. 398-added the violations of vehicular
homicide and vehicular assault as grounds for suspension.
N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1931, ch. 669-authorized suspension where the
motorist forfeited bail after being charged with enumerated violations; also
mandated suspension against a resident who failed to satisfy certain judg-
ments awarded anywhere in the United States, or in the Dominion of
Canada. See note 20, supra. 1
27 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1936, ch. 293-limited to three years the period of
suspension for failure to satisfy a judgment resulting from a motor vehicle
accident. Under present New York law, the license and registration are
revoked, without limitation, until the judgment, to the extent of statutory
limits, has been satisfied. N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAw § 318.
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leading ildlers in the nation. Indeed, the record number of
highway deaths which occurred in New York State in 1937
has never been surpassed since that date.2" Unfortunately,
these statistics were not limited to New York, and were
even worse for the rest of the nation.
The primary reason for the failure of these acts was
the basic flaw in their concept. The basic fallacy was that
the unsafe or irresponsible driver could be identified by
specified past events, i.e., a past conviction for certain viola-
tions or a prior accident in which a judgment remained
unsatisfied." Even assuming that the conviction-accident
approach would eventually bring most unsafe or irrespon-
sible drivers under the "proof" requirements, this desirable
goal was frustrated by the very provisions of the original
New York act. As discussed previously, a motorist was
subject to suspension, in the case of a motor vehicle acci-
dent, only if a final judgment was entered against him and
such judgment remained unsatisfied for a period of 15
days.3 However, few, if any, attorneys would recommend
the bringing of an action against a judgment-proof defend-
ant, especially in view of the contingent fee practice in tort
cases. As a result, the truly irresponsible motorist, one
who had no assets and could not respond to damages if
sued, seldom became the subject of an action which pro-
ceeded to final judgment. Therefore, the very provisions of
the original limited-compulsory act which were designed to
remove such motorists from the highway in reality were
never brought to bear in such cases. The problem was even
further aggravated by a 1936 amendment to the New York
act which provided that even where a judgment was entered
and remained unsatisfied, the motorist would have his
28 In 1937, 3,065 persons lost their lives in automobile accidents. Despite
the fact that total vehicle miles more than doubled by 1967, only 2,916
persons were killed last year. The number of persons killed per hundred
million miles of travel was 13.5 in 1937, and 4.8 last year.
2 The long-assumed relationship between violations and accidents has only
recently been closely studied, with somewhat inconclusive results. See
REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, dated
April 4, 1967, and speech by Goldstein, the National Safety Congress,
Chicago, Illinois, October, 1963.
3OSee text accompanying note 20, supra.
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license restored after three years if he submitted proof of
his ability to respond to damages in the future.31
As a result of the obvious failures of the original
acts,32 the efforts to revise and strengthen the limited-
compulsory insurance laws throughout the country were
intensified in the late 1930's and early 1940's."
EXTENDBD LITMITI)-COMPULSORY INSURANOB
One of the first states to adopt the extended limited-
compulsory insurance concept was, New Hampshire." Dur-
ing the first four years under the New Hampshire act, it
was estimated that the percentage of insured vehicles in
that state rose from 25% to approximately 70%.3s By
1941, the demands for insurance reforms in New York
State forced the adoption of a new extended limited-
compulsory insurance act in that state. 6 The new act was
entitled the "Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act." As
was the case in 1929, the 1941 act was supported by the
insurance industry as an alternative to the "pure" com-
pulsory insurance legislation which was also being consid-
ered by the Legislature at that time." The "pure" compul-
31 See szupra note 27.
32 In 1941, it was estimated that the percentage of insured cars operated
in New York State was as low as 25%. See Memorandum from S. Ellen-
bogen to Governor Lehman, recommending approval of Chapter 872 of the
Laws of 1941 (New York State Library Bill Jacket Collection).
33 In 1935, pursuant to a recommendation contained in the Governor's
annual message to the Legislature, the Committee on Compulsory Automo-
bile Insurance and Safety was established to study both the compensation
and safety problems inherent in vehicle operation. The report of this com-
ihittee indicated a need for the further study of the subject of "automobile
accident compensation." Accordingly, the Joint Legislative Committee to
Investigate Automobile Insurance was established to study and make recom-
mendations on this subject. The work of this committee culminated in the
enactment of an extended limited-compulsory insurance act in New York
in 1941. N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, ch. 872. The reports of these committees
present an excellent historical analysis of the development of the subject of
liability insurance through 1937.' LEG. Doc. No. 87 (1936); LEG. Doc.
No. 84 (1937); LEG. Doc. No. 91 (1938). Another excellent treatment
of this subject may be found in the New York Insurance Department's
1951 Report, entitled "The Problem of the Uninsured Motorist"34 New Hampshire Pub. Laws, 1927, ch. 54.
35 See supra note 33.
36 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, ch. 872.
37 S. Intro. No. 2060, Print No. 2614 (1941).
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sory insurance legislation, which failed of passage, was
sponsored jointly by the New York State Insurance Depart-
ment and Bureau of Motor Vehicles. The successful "ex-
tended limited-compulsory insurance" legislation was spon-
sored by the New York State Bar Association, with the
active support of the insurance industry. The basic changes
contained in the 1941 Act may be summarized as follows:
(1) Suspension or revocation upon conviction. Whereas the former
law provided that the Commissioner could suspend the driver's
license and vehicle registration upon conviction of certain
enumerated offenses, the new act provided that the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles could suspend or revoke such privi-
leges upon "any reasonable ground" appearing on the records
of the Motor Vehicle Bureau.3 s The new act also provided
that when the Commissioner suspends or revokes the driver's
license of any person upon receiving a record of a conviction
for any offense under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, he must
also suspend the certificate of registration of any vehicle owned
by such person, until the required proof of financial respon-
sibility was filed. 9 The power of the Commissioner to sus-
pend a driver's license or vehicle registration pending receipt
of proof of ability to respond to damages in the future was
therefore greatly expanded under the new act.
(2) Suspension or revocation for unsatisfied judgments. The orig-
inal act, as discussed above, provided for the suspension of the
driver's license and vehicle registration only when a final judg-
ment in excess of $100 had remained unsatisfied for a period
of 15 days. Although the suspension under the original act
remained in effect until the judgment had been satisfied to the
extent of the statutory minimums, 40 the suspension was limited
to a period of three years as a result of a 1936 amendment 41
Under the 1941 act, the Commissioner was empowered to
order such suspension where the judgment was in excess of
$25 for property damage, or for any amount if for bodily
injury or death. Moreover, the three year limitation was
deleted.
(3) Suspension after motor vehicle accident. The major change
effected by the 1941 act was that any motorist involved in an
3s N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, ch. 872 § 94(c).
3 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, cl. 872 § 94-a.
40 $5,000 for bodily injury or death of one person, $10,000 for bodily
injury or death of two or more persons for one accident, and $1,000 for
property damage for one accident.
41 Sce supra note 27.
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automobile accident involving bodily injury or property dam-
age, in any amount, was required to report such accident to
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The failure to report
such an accident was punishable as a misdemeanor, and also
constituted a ground for the revocation or suspension of the
driver's license and vehicle registration.42
The Act further provided that not less than 10 nor more than
45 days after receipt of an accident report, where the accident
involved bodily injury, death, or property damage in excess
of $25, the Commissioner had to suspend the drivers' licenses
and vehicle registrations of all persons owning and operating
the motor vehicle or vehicles involved in such accident. 43
The suspension was issued regardless of the fault of the par-
ties, and stayed in effect until security was furnished for
damages arising out of the accident and proof of ability to
respond to damages in the future was submitted. The security
for damages arising out of the accident was returned after
one year if no action was pending or unsatisfied judgment
was outstanding against the motorist.4 4
The foregoing "security" and "proof" provisions did not apply
to a motorist who was insured for at least the statutory limits
at the time of the accident.
5
(4) Miscellaneous provisions. In addition to the three kinds of
proof allowed under the previous law,46 the 1941 act per-
mitted owners of fleets of more than 25 vehicles to file as
self -insurers.4 7  The Act also contained an unusual, but short-
lived provision which provided that where the registration of
a vehicle involved in an accident had been suspended, such
42 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, ch. 872 §94-f(b).
43 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, ch. 872 § 94-e(a).
44N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, ch. 872 §94-e(c). Such security was returned
immediately if the motorist obtained a release or obtained a judgment in his
favor. In addition, subdivision (e) of such section permitted a motorist,
with the consent of the injured party, to confess judgment and make install-
ment payments thereon. In such cases, the suspension was terminated after
proof of ability to respond to damages in the future was also submitted.
Section 94-d(a) also permitted a court to order any judgment to be paid
in installments, whereupon the suspension was terminated upon submission
of the required future proof. Section 94-d(d) contained an interesting pro-
vision which permitted a judgment creditor to consent to a termination of
the suspensions against the debtor, even where the judgment remained unsat-
isfied or an installment payment had not been made.
45See supra note 43. Such insurance could be in the form of a liability
policy or bond, in the amounts of $5,000, $10,000 and $1,000.
46 Liability insurance, bond or deposit of money or securities.
47 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, ch. 872 § 94-gg. Similar provisions are now
contained in Section 361 of the N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law.
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vehicle could not be registered in the name of any person
during the period of suspension.48  Finally, the Act provided
that the expenses of administration would be assessed pri-
marily against insurance carriers doing business in the State,
a provision which is still contained in the present law.49
Despite the stricter provisions of the 1941 Act, it suf-
fered from the same basic conceptual defects associated
with the original 1929 Act."0 As with its predecessor, the
1941 Act was substantially amended between its effective
date and 1956, when the New York "pure" compulsory
insurance act was finally enacted. One of the more import-
ant additions to the provisions of the Act was a 1951
amendment which provided that no vehicle shall be regis-
tered in the name of a minor unless the vehicle is insured
by a "standard provisions automobile liability policy" in a
form approved by the Superintendent of Insurance."
The limited compulsory and extended limited-compul-
sory insurance acts failed to provide protection in the
following situations:
1. Where a New York vehicle was uninsured.2
2. Where an out-of-state vehicle was uninsured.
3. Where an insurer disclaimed liability because of
lack of notice, the insured's failure to cooperate, or
on other recognized grounds.
4. Where there was no liability, e.g., accidents involv-
ing only the driver injured by his own negligence,
4sN.Y. Sess. Laws, 1941, ch. 872 §94-h(c) and (d), amended by, N.Y.
Sess. Laws, 1942, ch. 720. But even under the 1941 Act, chattel mortgagees
and lienors were exempted from this provision if the security interest arose
prior to the effective date of the Act. Persons securing judgments against
the owner as a result of the accident were also exempted.
49 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAW §§317, 363. Self-insurers pay an
annual fee of $1.50 per registered vehicle, which fees are applied to reduce
the annual assessment levied against the insurance industry. N.Y. VEHICLE
& TRAFFIC LAW § 316.
50 See supra notes 29-33, and accompanying text.
51 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1951, ch. 296 § l-a.
52 Although it was estimated that nearly 907 of New York registered
vehicles were insured in 1955, the 10% Which remained uninsured continued
to pose an unsatisfied judgment problem in New York State. It should
be noted that the problem probably would have been greatly diminished by
the insured motorists' endorsement provisions which were first introduced by
the insurance industry in New York in 1955.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
injury to members of the family, where contributory
negligence barred recovery, where injuries or dam-
age were caused by hit and run drivers or drivers
of stolen vehicles.
As a result of these deficiencies, renewed attempts to
pass compulsory insurance legislation began again in New
York State in the early 1950's, although the final compul-
sory insurance act was not passed until 1956.
COMPULSORY INSURANCE
1. The New York Act.
In 1956, Governor Harriman, in a Special Message to
the Legislature, advocated the formation of a special state
fund which would compliment the extended limited-compul-
sory insurance law by providing coverage for uninsured
accidents. 3 This fund would be financed by a special 30
registration fee imposed on all vehicles not otherwise cov-
ered by insurance in the statutory minimum amounts. The
Governor also included reference in his message to compul-
sory insurance legislation, but indicated that the special
state fund, by itself, would be preferable.54
The Governor's recommendation was, in effect, the
partial implementation of the recommendations of the Joint
Legislative Committee to Study the Problem of Unsatisfied
Judgment Fund and Compulsory Insurance made in its
1954 report." That Committee was initially established in
1950, and was continued by joint resolution through 1955.
Pursuant to its recommendations, in 1953 and 1954, the
Committee sponsored bills in 1953, 1954 and 1955 embody-
ing the compulsory insurance approach.5 6 Companion bills,
also sponsored by the Committee, would have established
53 Punic PAPERS or GOVERNOR AVERLL HAMMAN, 40 (1956).
SThe Governor directed the Superintendent of Insurance to prepare
appropriate legislation on these subjects for submission to the Legislature.
55 LEG. Doc. No. 61 (1954).
56E.g., S. Intro. No. 1317, Print No. 1373 (1955).
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an "assigned case plan" to provide for the payment of
damages arising out of uninsured accidents."
Partially due to the opposition to these bills, and also
as a result of a change in administration, the Committee,
as reconstituted in 1955, reported that the subject needed
further study."
The administration's 1956 proposal would have con-
tinued the extended limited-compulsory insurance provisions
then in effect, but would have supplemented them by creat-
ing a state fund to compensate the victims of an uninsured
accident. The fund would be financed by special registra-
tion assessments on uninsured vehicles. The fund would
be used to pay damages for bodily injury resulting from
uninsured accidents, but would not be available to the
owner or operator of an uninsured vehicle. Furthermore,
where the fund was required to pay damages for an unin-
sured accident, the owner or operator of the insured vehicle
would be required to reimburse the fund. This approach
was rejected by the Legislature, which proceeded to approve
a compulsory insurance bill. Upon approval of this bill by
the Governor, compulsory insurance finally became a reality
in New York-over 30 years after it was first considered
by the Legislature. 9
The 1956 Act, entitled the Motor Vehicle Financial
Security Act, added a new Article 6-A to the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law. The Motor Vehicle Safety Re-
sponsibility Act (the extended limited-compulsory provi-
sions) was renumbered Article 6-B, but was not otherwise
amended."
Under the Compulsory Insurance Act, no vehicle, with
minor exceptions, could be registered in the State unless
57E.g., S. Intro. No. 2055, Print No. 2165 (1953).
5sLE. Doc. No. 80 (1955).
5 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655.
cOA 1957 amendment added a new section 94-r to Article 6-B to provide
that proof of financial responsibility no longer need be maintained pursuant
to such article. N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1957, ch. 706. Aside from that amend-
ment, however, the provisions of the old Safety Responsibility Act, are,
without substantial change, still a part of the New York Vehicle & Traffic
Law (Article 7).
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the registration application was accompanied by "proof of
financial security." Such proof could be evidenced by a
certificate of insurance, a financial security bond or a finan-
cial security deposit in the statutory amounts, or by qualifi-
cation as a self-insurer." The owner was required to im-
mediately surrender his registration certificate and number
plates upon termination or cancellation of insurance. The
failure to surrender such items before termination or can-
cellation took effect resulted in a 30 day revocation of the
registration of the vehicle.2 During this 30 day period,
no other vehicle could be registered in such person's name. 3
It should be noted that, as discussed below, a more severe
penalty resulted where the uninsured vehicle was actually
operated in the State.
The Act further provided that where an owner operated
a vehicle registered in this State while it was uninsured,
or permitted the operation of such vehicle, both the driver's
license and vehicle registration had to be revoked for one
year. 4 Where a non-owner operated such a vehicle, with
knowledge that the vehicle was uninsured, his license, or
non-resident driving privileges, as the case may be, was
also revoked for one year. 5
The Act also provided for a similar one-year revocation
where an uninsured vehicle not registered in New York was
operated within the State.66
61 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655 § 93-b (Now N.Y. VEHICLE &
TRAFFIC LAW § 312).
62 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655 § 93-h(a) and (b) (Now N.Y. VEHICLE
& TRAFFIC LAW §318(1)(a)).
63 Id. The Commissioner could also prevent registration of the vehicle in
the name of another where he believed such registration would have the
effect of defeating the purposes of the compulsory insurance law.
64N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655 §93-h 2 (a) and (b) (Now N.Y.
VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 318 2(a) and (b). As in the case of the 30 day
revocation, the Commissioner could also prevent the registration of such
vehicle in the name of another.
65N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655 §93-h 3(a) and (b) (Now N.Y.
VEHICLE & TRAFFrc LAW §318 3(a) and (b)).
66 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655 § 93-h 4(a) and (b) (Now N.Y.
VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 318 4(a) and (b)). In such cases the privileges
of operating in New York any vehicle owned by such person were revoked,
as were his personal operating privileges.
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In addition to the one-year revocation period, the
owner or operator, or both, where an accident occurred,
could not obtain a new license or registration, as the case
may be, until:
(1) any judgment had been satisfied, within the statutory limits; or
(2) a release had been obtained from all injured parties; or
(3) no cause of action had been commenced by an injured party
within a period of one year from the date of the accident; or
(4) a judgment was being paid in installments as permitted by law.6 7
The Act also provided for criminal penalties where a
vehicle registered in Netw York -was operated without finan-
cial security in effect. Under these provisions, if an owner
operated or permitted the operation of his vehicle while
uninsured, he was guilty of a misdemeanor. A non-owner
operator was also guilty of a misdemeanor if he had knowl-
edge that financial security was not in effect."
It should be noted that the criminal penalties did not
apply to vehicles not registered in New York, although the
revocation procedures applied regardless of where the
vehicle was registered.
The Superintendent of Insurance was given authority
to establish the minimum requirements for the required
liability policies, and the costs of administering the new
Article were assessed against the insurance companies writ-
ing policies in New York. 9
Although some technical and clarifying amendments
have been made,7" the original Act in a substantially un-
67N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655 § 93-h (Now N.Y. VEHICLE &
TRAFFIC LAW §318(9)).
6$N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655 § 93-i (Now N.Y. VEHICLE &
TRAFFIC LAW § 319).
69 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1956, ch. 655 §§ 93(4) (a) and (b), 93-g (Now N.Y.
VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW §§311(4) (a) and (d), 317). The minimum
requirements of $10,000 for bodily injury or death to any one person, and
$20,000 for bodily injury or death to two or more persons and $5,000 for
property damage arising out of any one accident were established in the Act.
70 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1957, ch. 732-amended the revocation and criminal
penalty provisions to make them applicable to unregistered vehicles. The
original act only applied to vehicles registered in New York or those regis-
tered elsewhere.
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changed form has been re-enacted as Article 6 of the New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law.
It should be noted that the Act requires a one year
revocation of the driver's license and vehicle registration
where an owner operates or permits his vehicle to be op-
erated without insurance. -Unlike the case of the non-owner
operator, the owner will suffer revocation (and conviction
if the vehicle is unregistered or is registered in New York)
even though he did not know the vehicle was uninsured.
The effect is even more harsh since a policy of insur-
ance may be terminated or cancelled after 20 days written
notice (10, days for non-payment of premium) has been
mailed to the address which appears in the policy. As a
result, an owner who has moved, without notifying his
insurance company, or who is on vacation when such notice
is mailed, often may be unaware that his insurance has
been terminated or cancelled. However, despite such lack
of knowledge, the owner will be subject to revocation penal-
ties if the vehicle is operated in this State by him or with
his permission. Moreover, such revocation is required even
though the vehicle has not been involved in an accident
-mere operation is sufficient.
2. Existing Extended Limited-Compulsory .Insurance.
As noted previously, the New York Extended Limited-
Compulsory Insurance Act was not repealed or amended
upon the enactment of the compulsory insurance legislation.
A 1957 amendment, however, provided that proof of finan-
cial responsibility no longer need be maintained pursuant
to the old Act.1 Such amendment was necessary to avoid
a situation in which the requirements for proof of financial
security were governed by two conflicting statutes."2 Al-
N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1957, ch. 1026-clarified the provisions governing the
assessment of the insurance industry for the expenses of administering the
article.
N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1959, ch. 661--clarified the notice provisions with
respect to termination or cancellation of insurance coverage.71 See supra note 60.
72 Aside from differences in form, the Compulsory Insurance Act required
proof upon registration, whereas the Extended Limited Compulsory Insurance
Act required such proof upon suspension of a license, conviction for enum-
erated offenses, or because of involvement in an accident.
[ VOL. 43
LIABILITY INSURANCE
though the legal effect of this one sentence amendment was
to repeal a substantial portion of the provisions of the old
Act, the actual provisions are still contained in the Vehicle
and Traffic Law. This has caused substantial confusion for
all except those who deal with such law on a day-to-day
basis."
The Extended Limited-Compulsory Insurance Act, how-
ever, still has an important application in situations involv-
ing the operation of an uninsured vehicle, without knowl-
edge, by a non-owner operator, or in cases involving
non-residents.
As indicated above, the administrative (revocation) and
criminal sanctions of the compulsory insurance law do not
apply where a non-owner operator operates an uninsured
vehicle without knowledge that the vehicle is uninsured.
Therefore, under the compulsory insurance law, no action
could be taken against such an operator even though he was
involved in an accident. The extended limited-compulsory
insurance provisions which are still in effect, however, fill
this gap by requiring the suspension of the driver's license
in such cases.7" Under these provisions, the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles must suspend the driver's license of any
person who owns or operates an uninsured vehicle which is
involved in an accident, if such accident has resulted in
bodily injury or death, or property damage in excess of one
hundred fifty dollars.7" Such suspension remains in effect
until security for damages, in an amount determined by
the Commissioner, is posted, a release is obtained, or the
operator or owner secures a judgment in his favor. 6
73 It is anticipated that the Department of Motor Vehicles, in cooperation
with the Legislature, will shortly begin on a much-needed recodification of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
7' The provisions of the 1957 amendment were re-enacted as Section 346
of the Vehicle and Traffic Law in 1959. Since this section only provides
that a person shall not be required to file or maintain proof of financial
responsibility after February 1, 1957 pursuant to the old act, the require-
ments of such act relating to suspension and security for past accidents still
apply. These requirements are now found in Sections 332 through 335 of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
7 5 N.Y. VEHIcLE & TRAmic LAW § 335.
76 N.Y. VEHIcLE & TRAmrc LAW § 337(b).
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The second application of the Extended Limited-Com-
pulsory Insurance Act relates to uninsured out-of-state ve-
hicles which are involved in accidents in New York. While
the owners and operators of such vehicles are subject to
the revocation penalty in New York under the Compulsory
Insurance Act, that Act has no extra-territorial applica-
tion. Where the operator of such vehicle is a resident,
the lack of extra-territorial application is of little conse-
quence, since he will be denied the right to operate a
vehicle in New York. However, where the owner or a non-
owner operator is a non-resident, he could continue to
operate his vehicle without restriction in any state except
New York if only the Compulsory Insurance Act were in
effect. The Extended Limited-Compulsory Insurance Act
again fills this gap because of its reciprocity provisions."3
Under these provisions, -the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
is required to forward a record of his suspension action in
such cases to -the person's home state. Since virtually all
states have similar reciprocal provisions, the home state
will suspend the driver's license or vehicle registration of
such person until he has complied with the security require-
ments of New York law.
Finally, the Extended Limited-Compulsory Insurance
Act in New York also requires suspension of any resident's
driver's license, or vehicle registration, as the case may be,
where such resident's license has been suspended under the
financial responsibility laws of any other state as a result
of an uninsured accident."
3. Unsatisfied Judgment Funds.
Although this topic is discussed under the general sub-
ject of compulsory insurance, there is no necessary connec-
tion between unsatisfied judgment funds and compulsory
77 A non-owner operator of an uninsured vehicle registered in another
state, as in the case where such vehicle is registered in New York, is not
subject to revocation unless he had knowledge that the vehicle was uninsured.
78 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 338(c).
79N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW §338(d). Subdivision (e) of such
section provides that "state" shall include the District of Columbia or any
province of the Dominion of Canada. The suspension action will only be
taken against the resident if such action could be taken had the accident
occurred in New York.
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insurance. Indeed, the first unsatisfied judgment funds
were enacted in the Province of Manitoba and the State of
North Dakota, jurisdictions which still do not have com-
pulsory insurance."0
As noted previously, the New York Joint Legislative
Committee which studied the uninsured motorist problem
in the early 1950's recommended the adoption of compulsory
insurance as well as an "assigned case plan." "' Under the
"assigned case plan," any person who had a cause of action
against an unknown or uninsured motorist because of death
or bodily injury, or property damage in excess of one hun-
dred dollars, could file a notice with the Superintendent
of Insurance within 30 days of the accrual of such cause
of action. The Superintendent would then assign such case
to an insurance company doing business in the state, and
such company would be obligated with respect to such cause
of action as if the unlmown or uninsured motorist were
insured by such company.
Since this plan was designed to supplement a compul-
sory insurance law, and the costs of the plan were consid-
ered a rating factor, the plan, in effect, would be paid for
by all insured motorists through increased premiums on
liability policies.
This plan was unlike an earlier plan which was pro-
posed in 1950 by Senator Hults, in which an unsatisfied
judgment fund would be established." Although both pro-
posals were designed to accomplish the same goal-to pro-
vide compensation in the uninsured accident-the Hults bill
was different in the following respects :"3
SO For an excellent discussion of such "gap-closing" measures, see R.
KETON AND J. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 110-19.
81 See supra note 57. The bill recommended by the Committee in 1954
is set forth in App. Q, LEo. Doc. No. 61 (1954). Many of the provisions
of this bill are now found in the act which established the New York
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation. N.Y. INs. LAw,
art. 17-A.
82 S. Intro. No. 2171, Print No. 2348 (1950). This bill was quite similar
to the plan then in effect in the Province of Alberta, Canada.
S3Both proposals required the uninsured motorist on whose account a
settlement was made to reimburse the fund or insurance company. Further-
more, the driving privileges of such person would not be restored until the
fund or company had been reimbursed. Significantly, however, neither pro-
posal disqualified an uninsured motorist from recovering under its provisions
where such motorist, himself, was injured.
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(a) It permitted recovery only after a judgment had been obtained
and efforts to collect such judgment proved fruitless;
(b) An additional fee of $.50 was charged upon the issuance or
renewal of a driver's license to develop the necessary fund;
(c) The fund was administered by the State.
Despite the differences in approach, it was obvious to
all that the Compulsory Insurance Act enacted in New
York in 1956, by itself, would not eliminate the "uncom-
pensated accident." Accordingly, the New York :Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation was estab-
lished, effective January 1, 1959.1" Because of the extensive
commentaries on the "IMVAIC Law," this article will only
present a brief synopsis of its provisions."
The MVAIC is a non-profit corporation, established by
law, with a membership consisting of all companies author-
ized by the Superintendent of Insurance to do any form of
automobile liability business in New York. The Corpora-
tion was created for the purpose of providing compensation
for personal injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident
where no insurance coverage is available to provide com-
pensation. The Corporation is funded by an annual assess-
ment against its members, and by the receipt of a special
$1.50 fee for every vehicle registered by an owner who is
either self-insured, or who establishes his financial respon-
sibility by posting a bond or other security.
The following persons are deemed "qualified persons"
under the law:
(a) any resident, except an insured or the owner of an unin-
sured vehicle and his spouse (or his legal representa-
tive) ;86 and
s4 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1958, ch. 759 (Now N.Y. INs. LAw, art 17-A).
85 See, e.g., Note, MVAIC Six Years Later-A Practical Appraisal,
39 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 321 (1965); Note, The Problem of the Financially
Irresponsible Motorist-New York's MVAIC, 65 COLUm. L. Ray. 1075
(1965) ; 16 SYRACuSa L. REv. 897 (1965).
s6 "Insureds" are excluded since they can obtain compensation under the
uninsured motorist indorsement on their motor vehicle policy. Owners of
uninsured vehicles and their spouses are excluded as a matter of policy,
since the operation of an uninsured vehicle is a criminal act, and such
operation is one of the very evils which necessitated the creation of the
MVAIC.
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(b) any non-resident, if the laws of such non-resident's domi-
cile afford a similar recourse to residents of New York.
Any "qualified person" may obtain payment for any
personal injuries (or death) within the limits of the statu-
tory motor vehicle liability policy, where such injuries are
caused by an uninsured motorist, or a "hit and run" driver.
Notice of intent to file a claim must be made within ninety
days of the accrual of the cause of action. 7 The notice
provisions have been strictly construed, and can only be
waived in a limited manner as provided by statute."8
An uninsured motorist will not have his driving or
registration privilege reinstated in New York until he has
reimbursed the MVAIC for any payments made by that
Corporation in his behalf."9
Although the MVAIC has handled over 58,000 claims
through its 10 year existence, and has paid a total of $35.5
million in compensation, there have been numerous instances
in which meritorious claims have been denied because of
failure to comply with the statutory notice provisions. To
the extent that such provisions are necessary to prevent
fraud and collusion, and to make prompt investigations of
accidents possible, the goal of providing compensation in
all "uninsured" cases must remain beyond reach.
4. Compulsory Insturance - A Continuing Issue.
The merits of the compulsory approach to the insuring
of motor vehicles has been debated, almost without reprieve,
since a commission was appointed in Massachusetts in 1920
to develop such an approach in that state. Indeed, the
legislative halls of virtually every state have become a
forum for discussions on this subject at one time or another
since that date. Moreover, the fact that a "pure" compul-
87 N.Y. INs. LAW § 608. Where the cause of action is against an un-
known person, the accident also must have been reported to the authorities
within 24 hours (unless such report was impossible, in which event the
report must be made as soon as reasonably possible). Where compensation
is sought from MVAIC because of an insurer's disclaimer, notice must be
made to MVAIC within 10 days of receipt of notice of such disclaimer.8s N.Y. Ixs. LAW § 608.
SON.Y. VEHICLE & TPAsmc LAW §318(11).
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sory system has only been adopted in three states to date
would tend to leave the impression that the arguments
against such an approach are compelling.
Although an attempt will be made to present such argu-
ments, with counter-arguments, in an objective fashion, the
reader should be aware that the author strongly favors the
compulsory approach as the only effective solution to a
serious social problem.
As noted earlier, the strongest opponent to the com-
pulsory insurance concept has been the insurance industry
itself, although the industry, quite obviously, is not without
some support in its position. The basic arguments ad-
vanced over the years against this approach, with their
counterpoints, are as follows:
(a) Compulsory insurance will lead to a state-operated in-
surance system 0° When compulsory insurance was first
advocated, most states had only recently adopted their
workmen's compensation statutes, which generally pro-
vided for a state fund alone or in competition with pri-
vate insurance. Therefore, there was substantial reason
to believe that a similar approach would follow if com-
pulsory automobile insurance were adopted. The fact that
this has not occurred in the three states which now have
compulsory insurance provides some rebuttal to this ar-
gument. Moreover, since compulsion, to some extent, is
present in all vehicle insurance systems in effect in this
country, the fear of a state insurance system should not
be used as an argument solely against the "pure" com-
pulsory insurance approach.
90The report of the New York 1937 Joint Legislative Committee to
Investigate Automobile Insurance stated:
Those unfamiliar with this entire subject will be surprised and
shocked to learn that the stock insurance companies have up to the
present time opposed compulsory insurance with all their strength.
The controlling reason for this opposition, in spite of contrary state-
ments by the companies, is undoubtedly the fear of State Insurance.
If every motorist must insure, will there not soon be a demand for an
Insurance Fund conducted by the State without cost? And if the
State writes automobile liability insurance, why not life, fire and acci-
dent insurance, as well? It is natural and proper that this possibility
should disturb those who make their living in the insurance business.
We believe that the State should keep out of the insurance business.
But we are willing to face that problem when it arises and are not
as fearful as the companies of the future as to make it necessary to
abstain from action simply because it may lead later to mistaken
action. LEG. Doc. No. 84, p. 67 (1937).
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(b) Compulsory insurance will nake ratemaking a political
process. This argument, as with most others, stems di-
rectly from the experiences in Massachusetts under its
compulsory insurance law. In that state, rates are estab-
lished annually by the Commissioner of Insurance, after
a public hearing. The opponents of compulsory insurance
are quick to point out the annual pilgrimage made to such
hearings by politicians seeking reelection, and the annual
reelection promises which are made to reduce insurance
rates. However, the state regulation of rate making exists
regardless of the insurance system in effect in a particular
state. Indeed, the New York Superintendent's authority
to approve automobile liability insurance rates, which pre-
dated the adoption of compulsory insurance in New York,
has remained substantially unchanged. Moreover, since a
great majority of motor vehicles are insured even in those
states which have not adopted compulsory insurance, it
is difficult to accept the argument that requiring the re-
maining vehicles to carry insurance will result in a change
in the particular state's philosophy governing rate regu-
lation.91
(c) Compulsory insurance would unduly restrict underwriting
practices and norumal business procedures. One of the
major points raised in this argument is that compulsory
insurance would require the insuring of risks who other-
wise would be considered uninsurable. However, the
limited-compulsory statutes present a similar problem. In-
deed, such statutes require insurance only in the high
risk cases. Furthermore, the insurance needs in such cases
have been met in most states, regardless of the insurance
approach used, by assigned risk plans.9 2
(d) Compulsory insurance results in a higher "claims con-
sciousness" on the part of the public, with a resulting
increase in insurance rates. To the extent that a higher
claims consciousness means that an injured party will seek
redress, this argument perhaps is more in favor of, than
against, compulsory insurance. If the argument refers
to the prosecution of false claims, it is doubtful that
honesty will be materially affected by a system which
results in all, rather than most, vehicles being insured.
9' In 1956, when compulsory insurance was adopted in New York, it was
estimated that between 85 and 90 percent of all privately owned vehicles
were covered by liability insurance.
92 Under such plans, a person who has been refused insurance by a pri-
vate carrier may apply for coverage under the assigned risk plan. Such
applications generally are distributed, on a proportionate basis, to the insur-
ance carriers writing motor vehicle policies in the state.
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There may, of course, be a tendency 0f the part of jurors
to make a more liberal award where it is felt that an
insurance company, rather than 'the defendant, will be
making payment. Again, however, there is some question
whether such a tendency, if it exists, will be very pro-
nounced in a state where a substantial portion of the
vehicles are already insured. In any event, there is no
statistical evidence that compulsory insurance, in fact, in-
creases insurance rates.
5. The Uninsured Resident Motorist.
Although the New York Motor Vehicle Accident In-
demnification Corporation, and the requirement that all
New York liability policies include an uninsured motorist
endorsement, 93 have greatly alleviated the consequences of
uninsured accidents, the uninsured motorist continues to
present a serious problem in New York. 4
First, property damage is not included under the unin-
sured motorist endorsement nor the IVVAIC provisions,
leaving the owner without a remedy .where the uninsured
motorist who causes the damage is also judgment proof.
Therefore, the present New York law does not provide for
the compensation of all the damages for which compensa-
tion might be received if the offending vehicle were insured.
Second, as noted previously, the one year revocations
which are required under New York law for uninsured
operation have unduly harsh effects, especially where the
driver's license is needed for employment, reasons.
One solution to this problem would be the enactment
of legislation providing for coterminous, non-cancellable in-
surance. Under such legislation, the liability insurance
covering each vehicle would be coterminous with the regis-
tration period of the vehicle. Furthermore, such insurance
could not be cancelled during the registration year for any
93N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(2-a).
94 In 1967, the Department of Motor Vehicles issued approximately 400,000
registration revocation orders because of lapse of insurance coverage. Such
revocations are for a 30 day period. In addition, approximately 6,000 orders
revoking both the driver's license and registration were issued because of the
operation of an uninsured vehicle. The revocation period in such cases is a
period of at least one year.
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purpose. As an alternative, the policy could be cancelled
only if the company acquired and surrendered the vehicle's
number plates to the Motor Vehicle officials.
Such a plan could also be coupled with statutory pro-
visions which permitted suspension of the driver's license
and vehicle registration where an insured fails to pay his
insurance premium. Although such an approach, admitted-
ly, is not without problems, it would effectively eliminate
the operation of uninsured registered vehicles. 5
COMPENSATING ACCIDENT VICnrMs -A Niw APPROACH
All phases of the development of motor vehicle liability
insurance in this country have had one major principle in
common-the continuation of the "fault" doctrine." There-
fore, regardless of the approach used in a particular state
to guard against the uninsured motorist, the assets of the
insurance company, and hence the compensation of the
injured party, are never brought to bear unless it can be
shown that the insured was at "fault." In addition, the
injured party, in most states, must also demonstrate that
he was completely without "fault" before he is entitled to
compensation. 7
Despite, or perhaps because of, the doctrine's origin,
it has been severely criticized over the past 40 years, es-
pecially in its application to motor vehicle accident cases.
In view of such criticism, it is appropriate to briefly explore
95 Massachusetts presently requires coterminous coverage, although policies
may be cancelled during the registration year. Since all registrations in
that state expire on the same date, the insurance companies are burdened
with the serious administrative problem of issuing or renewing all policies
in the same month. This problem would be avoided in New York, since
vehicle registrations expire on a staggered basis.
In addition, a non-cancellable requirement undoubtedly would cause most
companies to request the full prepayment of the annual premium, with a
resulting economic burden on vehicle owners. Similarly, premium finance
institutions would either refuse to finance policies in high risk cases, or they
would demand an overall increase in financing charges to offset resulting
losses.
90 See supra notes 1 and 9.
07Id. The medical coverage provisions of most policies do, however,
provide limited compensation, without a showing of "fault," for medical ex-
penses resulting from injuries incurred while "using" the insured vehicle.
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how well the negligence doctrine, developed literally in the
horse and buggy era, is able to serve the needs of a modern,
mechanized society.
In 1967, over 53,000 persons lost their lives and 1.9
million were injured in automobile accidents in this coun-
try, with a total estimated economic loss of 11 billion
dollars. In New York State, over 2,900 persons lost their
lives, and total accidents reached nearly 400,000, with
estimated losses of 850 million dollars. To put it another
way, in New York State, one out of every ten drivers, and
one out of every eight registered vehicles, will be involved
in traffic accidents in 1968.
The instant death and crippling injuries which result
when vehicles traveling up to, or in excess of, 60. miles per
hour collide certainly could not have been envisioned in the
society out of which the negligence doctrine evolved. Nor
could such a society comprehend the staggering economic
losses which our society accepts yearly almost without
complaint.
Perhaps the best assessment of how well the negligence
doctrine is serving our modern needs is found in Professors
Keeton's and O'Connell's book entitled Basic Protection
for the Traffic Victim. The authors therein conclude that
the present system is slow and cumbersome, unfair, expen-
sive, morally subversive, and, above all, does not actually
provide adequate compensation for victims of traffic acci-
dents. The supporting rationale for these conclusions may
be summarized as follows:
(a) slow and cumbersome-An accident victim who must
bring a legal action to obtain compensation can expect to
wait from two to five years, or even longer, before he
will have his day in court. The average person finds it
difficult, if not impossible, to wait such a lengthy period
to obtain funds to pay bills which became due during the
first few weeks or months after the accident.
(b) unfair-The present system often results in the overpay-
ment of small, "nuisance" claims, and the underpayment
of claims in the more serious cases. This is especially
true since the injured party must pay his legal expenses
out of his final settlement or award.
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(c) expensive-In announcing his appointment of a special
committee to study the compensation of victims of traffic
accidents, Governor Rockefeller noted that only one dollar
in payments were made to traffic victims in New York
for every two dollars and fifty cents collected in pre-
miums.9s The remaining funds were used to pay attorney
fees, investigators and other administrative expenses, as
well as to provide a profit to the industry. Many of such
expenses result only because the question of negligence,
under present law, must be resolved in each accident case.
(d) morally subversive-It is the rare case in which eye
witnesses will agree, in all particulars, as to how a par-
ticular event occurred. Indeed, often times such wit-
nesses will not agree in any particulars. This psycho-
logical phenomenon is even more pronounced when the
witness was an actual participant in the event, and the
event consisted of the sudden, traumatic experience of a
motor vehicle accident. This inability of recall fosters,
unconsciously in some cases and consciously in others, a
proneness to exaggerate one's own case, or to "fill in"
the missing gaps in a favorable manner. The result,
although perhaps favorable to the outcome of the case,
is decidedly unfavorable to the victim's integrity, and to
the integrity of the system as a whole.
(e) inadequate compensation-A recent article appearing in
the New York Times indicated that only 47% of the
traffic victims in a major city recovered their full losses,
and that 43% received no compensation at all.99 Pro-
fessors Keeton and O'Connell present a comprehensive
review of the compensation problem in their book, out-
lining the scope of the problem as it exists today. Al-
though the uninsured or judgment-proof driver undoubted-
ly contributes to the number of uncompensated accidents,
there is little question that the "fault" doctrine plays a
far more significant role.
After documenting their criticisms of the present lia-
bility system, Professors Keeton and O'Connell proceed to
exhaustively discuss the various alternatives which have
either been proposed or actually put into effect in other
countries.' 0 The authors then discuss the objectives of
Ds See siupra note 7.
09 Moynihan, Next: A New Auto Insurance Policy, N.Y. Times, Aug.
27, 1967 (Magazine).
100 R. KEET N & J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 5, at 124-236.
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automobile claims systems, and devote the remainder of
their book to their proposed solution, entitled "A Plan of
Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim."
The Basic Protection Plan would establish a compul-
sory system of insurance under which the "fault" doctrine
would be partially abolished. Unlike the approach presently
used in this country, in which the vehicle owner insures
against his liability to others, the authors' plan would
require every vehicle owner to obtain insurance covering
himself, his family and dependents, and other users of the
vehicle. Such insurance would provide compensation for
injuries suffered in an accident without regard to fault.
Conceptually, therefore, the new insurance plan would be
somewhat similar to the medical payments coverage of cur-
rent policies. Persons who intentionally cause or suffer
injuries would be excluded, and such persons would be
required to reimburse any insurance company which made
payments to third parties on account of intentionally in-
flicted injuries.
Under the Basic Protection Plan, all vehicle owners
would be required to obtain insurance in the minimum re-
quirement of $10,000 for bodily injury to any one person.
The coverage would be available to compensate the named
insureds, members of the family and users of the vehicle
for any injury resulting from an automobile accident. In
addition to providing compensation for such injuries with-
out regard to fault, the plan would eliminate the right to
collect the first $5,000 of tort damages for pain and suffer-
ing. Therefore, the $10,000 coverage essentially would pro-
vide payment for economic losses. Any person who suffered
tort damages for pain and suffering of less than $5,00G, and
other tort damages of less than $10,000, would be required
to obtain compensation under the Basic Protection Plan.
If the prospective tort damages were in excess of these
amounts, the individual could proceed with a civil action
for such damages. However, any tort judgment would be
reduced by these amounts.
The Basic Protection Plan would provide compensation
to the injured party for his economic losses as such losses
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arose. A $100 deductible would be imposed to eliminate
the minor cases, and a ceiling would be imposed on the
maximum amount which could be collected for lost wages.
Aside from this deductible, and maximum limitation, the
compensation plan would provide complete compensation for
all losses.
Although the authors excluded property damages from
the original Basic Protection Plan, they have subsequently
supplemented their original proposal with a plan for com-
pensating property 'damage losses.
Although the Basic Protection Plan does eliminate the
doctrine of fault with respect to tort cases involving less
than 510,000 in damages, it does not adopt a workmen's
compensation type approach to automobile accident cases.
The plan does not establish any schedules for injuries suf-
fered, but merely provides for the compensation of all
economic losses (within the deductible, wage and maximum
coverage limitations) as such losses arise.
Since a great majority of all accident cases result in
damages of less than $10,000 (especially with the exclusion
of the first $5,000 for pain and suffering), the Basic Pro-
tection Plan would provide compensation in a great major-
ity of motor vehicle accident cases. The elimination of the
necessity to initiate legal proceedings in such cases would,
of course, have a significant impact on present court calen-
dar congestion. The plan would provide compensation in
virtually every accident case, and it is anticipated that
insurance premiums might be reduced as much as 25%.01
CONCLUSION
The search for a plan which will adequately compen-
sate victims of traffic accidents began in the early 1920's,
and has culminated in most states with the adoption of
101 Harwayne, Insurace Cost of Automobile Basic Protection Plan in
Relation to Automobile Bodily Injury Liability Cost, 53 PRoCEEMINGS OF THE
CASUALTY ACTUARIAL Sociavv 122 (1966). Despite the exhaustive analysis
made by Mr. Harwayne, other actuaries have argued that savings would be
a great deal less, or non-existent. See Focus on Basic Protection Insurance,
63 BEsTs IN s. NEws 10 (Fire & Casualty Edition, Nov. 1967).
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extended limited compulsory insurance acts. Three juris-
dictions have proceeded beyond this stage to the adoption of
compulsory insurance laws. Despite the merits of existing
legislation, it is quite evident that victims of motor vehicle
accidents presently are not receiving prompt and fair com-
pensation for their injuries. Although additional steps can
be taken to further reduce the number of uninsured acci-
dents (adoption of ,compulsory, non-cancellable, coterminous
insurance requirements), there is a serious question as to
whether a system based on fault can ever be fully responsive
to the needs of our modern society. The plan of Basic
Protection for the Traffic Victim proposed by Professors
Keeton and O'Connell presents a new approach to the
problem of compensating a traffic victim, one which would
provide full and prompt payment for losses actually suf-
fered. Furthermore, it is estimated that the Basic Protec-
tion Plan would actually result in a reduction of insurance
premiums to vehicle owners. Such an approach to the solu-
tion of what can only be classified as a major social prob-
lem, deserves the most serious consideration of the bench,
the bar and the public at large.
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